Gajalakshmi
Paramasivam – 20 May 2016
The ‘Only’ Syndrome
We have/had the ‘White Only’ syndrome in
Australia. We have/had the ‘Sinhala Only’ syndrome in Sri Lanka. We have/had
the ‘Tamil Eelam Only’ claim in Northern Sri Lanka. Recently I realized that we
have also the ‘Legal Only’ syndrome in the Judiciary. Is this a problem or an
opportunity? When the law clearly states that it is ‘only’, then it is an opportunity to those within the
‘only’ group. When the law is silent then the advantage is to those who have
majority power at that time at that place. This could even be
‘outsiders/opposition’ to the ‘only’ group – for example – ‘Sinhala Only’ when
it was no longer the law, became an opportunity to the Tamil Tigers who became
its ‘Other side’ and claimed ‘Tamil Eelam Only’. Towards this they claimed
‘Separation’ – as Pakistan did.
Whether we as individuals like it or not,
whether we approve or not, such separations do happen. The Common example I am
highly conscious of now, is the Judicial system. In Australia where my active
participation in the Judicial system began, Judges usually were driven by the
stronger legal power in the court which is often not the stronger legal mind in court. Below is an
extract from my Naan Australian book which includes publication of this
discovery:
‘After Justice
Hughes decided to judge against me in the District Court in matter 4054/04 on
11 July 2006 (my
cousin Krishna ’s birthday. My cousin was
killed by the Tamil Tigers in the Tiger Capital of Vanni which was Krishna ’s home as a farmer) Justice Hughes and Barrister
Hodgson registered the following in the Public records:
Hodgson: Your Honour said dismiss the notice of
motion, I think it should be dismiss the proceedings.
(The State of New
South Wales applied for a dismissal of my
compensation claim through a notice of motion and if the notice of motion was
dismissed then my claim ought to have gone to trial. On the basis of the real value of the matter it ought to have
gone to trail and this is what was being mouthed by the Judge’s subconscious
mind because the judge as a man past his retirement age, was merely occupying
the seat and was not strongly committed either way)
Justice Hughes: Well I should have said – I make
orders in favour of the notice of motion brought by the applicant to the notice
of motion and I strike out the notice of motion pursuant to s 13.4—
Hodgson: Sorry, your Honour again there are – your
Honour said strike out the notice of motion.
Justice Hughes: Strike out the further amended
statement of claim on 9 May
2006 , pursuant to part 13 rule 13.4 Now was there another order you
wanted?
(So, Hodgson only had to ask and it shall be given and
Hodgson did ask. It was as if he was drafting the orders and Justice Hughes was
merely signing them)
Hodgson: Yes, that the proceedings be dismissed
pursuant to part 13 rule 13.4
Justice Hughes: I’ve done that, yes.
Hodgson: And I seek an order for costs of the proceeding
as well as of the further amended notice of motion and I seek to hand up an
offer of compromise which bears the date of 13 February 2006, together with a
covering letter to the plaintiff of the same date. The plaintiff has those. I
seek an order that the costs be on the indemnity basis from the day on which
the offer was made.
(The offer had no genuine substance to it but was for
each party to pay their own costs and for me to withdraw the application. In
other words that offer was to register Hodgson’s claim for indemnity costs.
This tactic has been used in the current matter before the Federal Magistrates Court
also – by the Crown Solicitor offering me $10,000 to withdraw my case. The
‘offer’ dated 22 August 2007, stated ‘If
you agree to execute the attached deed of release and to a dismissal of your
complaint my client in exchange will (1) Pay you $10,000 and (2) Provide you
with a letter from the Police stating “The NSW Police regret and are sorry that
you consider that you were subjected to racial discrimination and hurt and
humiliation when you were arrested and chargted on the following dates –
15/9/2003; 10/11/2003; 22/10/2004; 29/10/2004. Ms Barbaro stated also ‘my
client does not concede that the police have discriminated against you’. I wrote
back ‘If your client genuinely believes that it has NOT unlawfully
discriminated against me, it is unlawful of your client to offer me any
compensation – by of money or status. It is unlawful, as per fundamentals of
Accounting to pay without ‘consideration’. It is in breach of Section 12 of the
Public Finance & Audit Act by which your client as well as you are
governed.’ I did not know about this indemnity
tactic back in July 2006. But Natural Justice did protect me. I
wrote also ‘Ms Barbaro, your client
claimed costs in relation to Common Law claims and estimated costs in relation
to Equal Opportunity / Unlawful Discrimination currently before the Court.
Those costs are in the ratio of 17:4, indicating the status of Equal
Opportunity in relation to Human Rights. Your offer to me is about half the
estimated costs in this Equal
Opportunity Court , for your client. In summary,
your client is claiming double my status in an Equal Opportunity Court and 9 times my
status in Human Rights Court .
If you truly believe that they are right and I am not of a higher status than
your client in this court, then my standards are different to yours and we are
not bound by Common Higher Goals / Value. To my mind, the claim of 6.8 million
dollars is genuine. If you client(the State of NSW )
pays me compensation, your client gets shared ownership in my investment
in Equal Opportunity which is also investment in Anti Terrorism. Had we
actively practiced Anti Discrimination laws we would not be anxious of
Terrorism. Ms Barbaro, you are a young
female. What have you done to uphold elimination of gender based discrimination
in your workplace which is also the workplace of the Police? Women Police
Offices have publicly complained of unlawful discrimination. The more you cover
up blind subjective discrimination the more terrorism you promote. Fears of
terrorism are also terrorism through effects. I am a female and I seem very
ethnic. If you shared your female status with me you would appreciate for
yourself how much more courage I would have needed to uphold my Truth in the
face of all this intimidation. I am doing what you and other Australian females
have failed to do. I am doing so through deep trauma – for each time I recall
my loss I do feel traumatized. You provoked it in many ways through your
application for summary dismissal and requirement to pay costs in advance. If
you lived with me without any other distraction you would appreciate my pain
much more than you do now. Ms Barbaro, if I were after money, I would have
continued in my Senior Accountant’s position with UNSW Medical Faculty and
possibly continued to work for Professor Bruce Dowton who did value my work
highly. I would then have earned at least a million dollars from then to now. I
‘paid’ / ‘forewent’ all that to prevent Terrorism in Australia . My court records would
confirm that I shared this Anti Terrorism wisdom with Mr. Howard and his
government in 1999 – two and a half years before 9/11 and its consequences.
Likewise, with the UNSW Vice Chancellor. I do believe that even though I was
ignored and ‘dismissed’ my committed work has minimized the damage for
Australians. If I accept your offer, I would throw away my own work and it could easily be owned by rebels fighting
for self-determination – as happened in Sri Lanka . Whether we are good or
bad, our genuine work automatically produces costs and benefits; problems and
opportunities. I would rather continue to keep my ownership as Australian than
let go irresponsibly – knowing the strong possibility of it being hijacked by
others less ‘Australian’ than myself. The more pain I endure to keep our
weaknesses ‘inside’ but not suppressed but as visible parts of our system –
being balanced by the strength of my work – the more AUSTRALIAN I feel. I urge
you to educate your client to become self-balancing.’ )
Judge Hughes: What do you want to say about costs Ms
Paramasivam. What do you want to say about costs?
I said ‘I have nothing to say’.
Justice Hughes: Nothing to say? Well say what you were
going to say before, that you did your best.
I said ‘I did your Honour’
Justice Hughes: In that case I won’t order indemnity costs. It is sufficient the costs should be
paid on the usual basis that the person was after all, self-represented despite
her receiving advice from Blake Dawson Waldron to discontinue her claim. She
nevertheless went ahead with it. I do not think it is appropriate and it would
seem to be punishing the self represented plaintiff too much if I ordered
indemnity costs. True it is that the costs of this action must have cost the
State a lot of money with all the pleadings and the court times and everything
else that’s been going on. Nevertheless, I order that costs be on the usual
basis.
The costs
subsequently claimed by the Crown Solicitor’s office appeared to be indemnity
costs. But the way the system goes – no one seemed to care.
Now I appreciate
more and more the value of Lord Krishna’s message – to focus on our Duty rather
than on the outcomes. There needs to be a Position for there to be Duty. There
needs to be a Structure for there to be a Position. Hence, when we do our Duty
– we become part of the System that is the Source of that Duty.
In the above
example, Lawyer Hodgson for the Government and therefore the State – was the
system that Judge Hughes became part of. By sticking to my interpretation of the Law –
I became part of the official system – as it ought to have existed and not as it
existed due to lesser legal minds.
Recently, I went
through disappointment when our own lawyer failed to include my points in
submitting our arguments in a Testamentary Proceeding. My arguments were based
on my own interpretation of the applicable laws. The base as usual was my real
life experience. The young lawyer, would
want to ‘win’ as per his understanding of how the legal system worked in
Jaffna. Submitting my points may have been difficult if according to him, the
system did not have the resources to hear a matter at the escalated level. The
issue was about whether a Court order was final judgment or interlocutory
order. When I sought to Appeal I was
informed by our lawyer in the primary court – that the matter was
interlocutory. I did not question it but given that our lawyer failed to even
get us a copy of the judgment within a week – I set out to work on the Leave to
Appeal Application myself – using the Australian format in the confidence that
in Australian Courts – my Administrative work was well accepted. The papers were filed within the stated
time of 14 days – even though we
received the Order was pronounced on 26 February 2015 but a copy was handed
over to our Attorney at law – only on 12 March 2015. The Application for Leave
to Appeal was filed through our General Attorney on 16 March 2015 – effectively
giving us 4 working days. It was a marathon effort with me in Australia and our
General Attorney with least exposure to the Court system being in Vaddukoddai.
But we did it – thanks to the good Administrators within the Court system –
which included the Duty Judge. I feel that victory even now. Other wins and
losses as declared by those who are ‘outsiders’ to that system as it exists in
reality – are truly secondary.
The Common
problem as I identify here in Sri Lanka is this ‘Only’ system. Those who make
it ‘law’ confirm their own inability to manage wider cultures. If the legal
fraternity is one culture – the executive government is of another. Like
religions they are different in terms of the laws and principles used at their
highest levels. In terms of Courts – the
executive is replaced by the citizen who must remain independent of the legal
profession to produce outcomes that would strengthen society as a whole.
Unpracticed theory / law – used by the legal fraternity must not be
indiscriminately mixed with Experience based facts presented by the citizen. The
point at which the two – investment in law and the real experience by the
citizen outside the influence of the Judiciary / Legal Profession – is the
Natural point of generation of higher
powers through which that society is governed. Like man and woman the two are Equal
parents of those higher values.
The real judgments are the express outcomes of
these values. I found that in Sri Lanka, where lay litigants are not valued in
the Court rooms – the legal profession hijacks the matter and that there is
little space for the citizen to bring her/his experience as is to the Courts. One
of the areas through which I highlighted this was as the Affidavit Evidence (us
being the 5th and 6th Respondents):
[It is submitted
that having taken over the inquiry through Section 532 of the Civil Procedure
Code, the Court had the Duty of Care to
summon all Respondents to Court to determine the Rights of all Heirs and also
to determine the issue of Administration. Until such process is exhausted the
inquiry process does not get completed and any order prior to such completion
becomes Interlocutory in Nature. The Rights of both opposing parties need to be
facilitated to be on Equal Footing – for the picture of the issues between the
parties to be complete at that level
The Affidavit of the 5th Respondent who expressly Objected, was set
aside, in breach of the above principle -
even though, on the face of it,
it failed to confirm the deficiencies claimed by the Petitioners.
Section 438 of the
Civil Procedure Code provides as
follows:
438. Every affidavit shall be entitled as in the court and action in
which it is to be used, and shall be signed by the declarant in the presence of
the court, Justice of the Peace, or Commissioner before whom it is sworn or
affirmed.
It is apparent on the face of the documents (Pages 168 to 173 of the Brief) that the Petitioners
applied their standards which are facilitated by Section 439 as follows:
‘439. In
the event of the declarant being a blind or illiterate person, or not able to
understand writing in the language of the court, the affidavit shall at the
same time be read over or interpreted to him in his own language, and the
jurist shall express that it was read over or interpreted to him in the
presence of the court. Justice of the Peace, or Commissioner, and that he
appeared to understand the contents; and also that he made his mark or wrote
his signature in the presence of the court, Justice of the Peace, or
Commissioner. And when a mark is made instead of a signature, the person who
writes the marksman's name against the mark shall also sign his name and
address in the presence of the court. Justice of the Peace, or Commissioner.’
The above mentioned Affidavit by the Petitioners under Section 439, is
almost identical to the Application / Petition itself – at pages 158
to 161 of the Brief. This confirms that
the Affidavit was prepared for the Petitioners by their Legal Attorney. Hence
the question arises as to whether the matter is to be constructed at the level
of the Petitioners’ investment in law or at the level of the 5th
Respondent’s investment – which is close to that of the Deceased? The
completion of the ‘issues between the parties’ needs to happen at the higher
level of application of the law – which it is submitted is through Section 438
for the 5th Respondent – the closest sibling representing the
investment in Higher Education by the Deceased. This is in conformity with the
principles underpinning Thesawalamai which has been claimed to be applicable to
all parties to this matter. It is submitted that this upholds the Spirit of the
Court which ordered that husband of the 1st Petitioner be included
as Petitioner.
(s) It is submitted that this Testamentary case is primarily
about the Rights of the Deceased to
show the value of his life to the
society that he was a part of. This
value is best shown through the structure that he developed during his
lifetime. The division of status and property reflects how the heirs carry this
forward to benefit current society and the younger generations. ]
The Confirmation that the Legal fraternity ‘took-over’ the matter was highlighted through
the submission ‘The above
mentioned Affidavit by the Petitioners under Section 439, is
almost identical to the Application / Petition itself’ . But our lawyer who also would have done
likewise, left this out of his submissions. Unless the Judge himself were
looking to improve the legal system – it is highly likely that the Judge also
would have left the above submission out of his picture of the matter.
When the Judicial system fails to deliver
Justice Independent of the Legal Profession – the outcomes often result in
weakening of law and order in that part of the society that takes only the
‘outcomes’ home. Those who work the system from their official position –
however small that position may be – become part of the higher system – as
owners. In Prescriptive rights – the ownership of the belief based occupier –
is determined on the basis of two elements – that the possession needs to be adverse to and be independent of the legal owner. The Experience based litigant in
Court is entitled to ownership where her/his practice of ownership rights –
have been adverse to and independent of the legal profession.
Hence, in terms of ‘Eelam Only’ / ‘Sinhala
Only’ / ‘White Only’ claims – they need to be adverse to the wider official
laws as practiced by the global community that we are officially a part of and
they need to be independent of the legal
owners who are ALL citizens of that country. None of the above claims qualified
– as per the latter criterion of independence.
Those who find ‘fault’ with the other side are also confirming that they need
their ‘other side’ to be complete and independent. To the extent the Tamil
politicians find fault with Sinhala regimes – the Tamil Community is
disqualified from claiming belief based ownership of areas where they are in
majority. Belief is Absolute and not Relative. Hence no ‘Eelam only’ but ‘Eelam
also’. Eelam only does not have the approval of Natural Justice due to its lack
of independence of the official system.
As a lay litigant – to me the place that confirms the value of this
Absolute Power would naturally be driven by good order. All others who think
they are the top-leaders due to ‘separation’ but continue to use the old order
of thought – end up confusing themselves and the societies they are a part of. Such minds naturally infect those who ‘leave
the process to them’ but take only the outcomes home.
Those who are clever and ‘produce’ wins to
take them ‘home’ without sharing with all those who fought and sacrificed for
their own independence – disqualify themselves from governance positions. It’s that sharing that makes us eligible to
hold governing positions.
POINTS OF SUBMISSION BY GAJALAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM
IN THE CIVIL
APPELLATE HIGH COURT OF JAFFNA,
DEMOCRATIC
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
Application
for Leave to Appeal - In the matter of Intestate Estate of the late SUBRAMANIAM YOGANATHAN of
Kallady
Lane, Vaddukoddai South West Vaddukkodai - Case No. T/55/11 Heard in the
District Court of Mallakam
Subramaniam
Paramasivam
Gajalakshmi Paramasivam
Both of 906/56, Carr Street
Coogee; NSW 2034; Australia
1st&
2nd Appellants
Testamentary Jurisdiction - District
Court
of Mallakam Case No. T/55/11 ----vs------
1.
SellathuraiMahadevan
2.
SakthidevyMahadevan
Both of Kallady Lane
Vaddukoddai South West
Vaddukkodai
1st
and 2nd Respondents
3.SubramaniamTharmalingam
4.Anandaletchumy Tharmalingam
Both of 25/1A, Subodharma Road,
Dehiwala
3rd&
4th Respondents
5.TharmaratnamSabanathan
6.SaraswathySabanathan
Both of 37, Old Field Road
Seven Hills; NSW 2147; Australia
5th&
6th Respondents
Points
for Submission due by 18 May 2016
1.
A.
The first Objection raised by the Appeal Respondents was that the Leave to
Appeal Application was out of time.
B.
(i) The original Application for Leave
to Appeal was filed within the prescribed period of 14 days under the Authority
of Section 754 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code which states as follows:
“Any person who shall be dissatisfied with any order made by any original court in
the course of any civil action, proceeding, or matter to which he is or seeks
to be a party may prefer an appeal to the Court of Appeal against such order
for the correction of any error in fact or in law with the leave of the Court
of Appeal first had and obtained.”
(ii)
As stated on page 7 of that Application :
‘ the Order was delivered by his Honour Justice
Gajanithibalan in the
Testamentary Proceedings bearing No.
T/55/11 in the District Court of
Mallakam, on Thursday 26 February 2015.’
The
Application was filed on 16 March 2015 which is within the 14 day period.
Copies were duly forwarded to the Respondents.
(iii)
When the Application for Leave to Appeal came before the Court on 06 May 2015,
the Court required amendments to be made to the format of the Application and
this was NOT objected to by the Appeal Respondents, who were present in Court.
(iv)
The Application was duly amended and filed within the time allowed by the Court
(v)
It is submitted that the Claim of the Counsel for the Appeal Respondents in Court
on 26 April 2016 – that the ‘Application wasAbandoned’ has the effect of
misleading the Court. The claim made on that basis - that the Amended
Applicationwas ‘out of time’ is without the
support of law.
2.
A. The second point of Objection
was that the decision by the primary Court was a final judgment and was not an
interlocutory order.
B.(i)
There were further discussions on this point – and the Counsel for the Appeal Respondents
made reference to the Rights of the parties being an issue.
Rights Base
(ii)
There are two aspects to this matter from the angle of the 5th&
6th Respondents:
(a)
That
Administration is required
(b)
The
share of the Estate that the siblings are entitled to. The Petitioners have
claimed Equal share whereas the 5th& 6th Respondents
claim that only the two surviving Brothers are entitled to half share each.
The
Appellants claim that the Decision by the Court is Interlocutory due to the inquiry stagnating at the level
the Petitioners perceive/d their entitlement rather than at the level – that
represents the Rights of the Deceased, carried forward by All his Heirs. It is submitted that the picture presented to
Court is complete only when both sides present at the same level – i.e. using
the same set of laws and principles applied on Equal footing to present ‘facts’
and ‘beliefs’the parties consider to be relevant. Hence the Rights based
approach to determining whether the Order was Interlocutory or Final Judgment. It is submitted that a final judgment needs a
completed picture of relevant facts and beliefs presented to Court and the Appellants
claim that this is NOT the case with this Decision due to the following
reasons:
On
page 4 of the Application filed on 16 March 2015, the Appellants state as
follows:
‘Errors in Law - If the
Proceedings were driven by Cause of the
action – then the following approach seems the better fit:“It seems to me that the real test
for determining this question ought to be this: Does the judgment or order, as
made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties? If it does, then I think it
ought to be treated as a final order; but if it does not it is then, in my
opinion, an interlocutory order.” -
Lord Alverstone, C.J cited by Hon
Justice SaleemMarsoof, P.C., J. inStorerDuraisamy Yogendra &BalasubramaniamThavabalan Vs. VelupillaiTharmaratnam’
In S.
RajendranChettiar& Others Vs S. Narayanan ChettiarS.C.Appeal
No. 101A/
2009, escalated from the District
Court case No. 428/T in the District Court of Colombo in relation to the Trustees of the Hindu Temple known as “Sri
Kathirvelayuthan Swami Kovil”, Dr.Shirani A. Bandaranayake, J
includes in her Honor’s reasoning the following:
[After an examination
of the aforementioned decisions, Sharvananda, J., (as he then was) had held
that for an ‘order’ to have the effect of a final judgment and to qualify to be
a ‘judgment’ under section 754(5) of the Civil Procedure Code,
“1. it must be an
order finally disposing of the rights of the parties;
2. the order cannot be
treated to be a final order if the suit or action is still left a live suit or
action for the purpose of determining the rights and liabilities of the parties
in the ordinary way;
3. the finality of the
order must be determined in relation to the suit;
4. the mere fact that
a cardinal point in the suit has been decided or even a vital and important
issue determined in the case, is not enough to make an order, a final one.”]
The following Reasoning is
presented including in the consciousness of the above
(iii)
The Reasons why the Appellants consider
that their Rights were denied by the Court
(a) The 1st Appellant (
5th Respondent in the primary case), being the brother of the
Deceased, filed an Affidavit in support of his Objection to the Petition. The 5th& 6th
Respondents sought Administrative rights
to the Intestate Estate. They claimed also that the two sisters who were
dowriedincluding by the Deceased were not entitled to share in the wealth of
brothers as per section 7 of Thesawalamai Regulation. This aspect was inquired
into at length , by the primary Court.Questions 6 & 7 listed on page 40 of
the brief refers.
(b) The questions raised by the
Court on 06 September 2012, in relation to the Objection and supporting
Affidavit filed by the 5th& 6th Respondents are
listed on pages 39 & 40 of the brief.
(c) The Petitioners/1st&
2nd Appeal Respondents, claimed that the said Affidavit (page 198 of
the Brief) was not signed in the presence of Attorney at law or Justice of the Peace
and also that the details of such an official were not evidenced to have been
made at the same time the 5th Respondent signed the Affidavit. (Pages 44, 45 of the Brief)
(d) Accordingly, the Petitioners
moved to have the Objection and the supporting Affidavit of the 5th
Respondent, set aside in limine
(e) In his Order dated 8 November
2012, his honor confirms that the Counsel for the 5th& 6th
Respondents/Appellants had requested that approval be granted for the filing of
an Affidavit to suit the expectations of the Court in relation to format.(ref
page 110 of the Brief)
(f) His Honor through Order dated
08 November 2012 (Page 106 of the Brief) declined
(g) In his reasons for Order dated
28 February 2013, his honor confirms (ref page 114 of the Brief) that the
Petitioners failed to file consent from respondents / fellow heirs.
(h) His honor stated that the
decision regarding the Affidavit would
be delivered at the end of the hearing. (Page 115 of the Brief)
(i) In his decision dated 26
February 2015, his honor states that the said Affidavit was set aside through
the order on 28 February 2013. (page 151
of the Brief)
(j) It is submitted that - given
that this decision regarding the Affidavit was pronounced for the first time on
26 February 2015 – by its very nature – it makes the decision that includes
this pronouncement a part of itself – Interlocutory.
(k) His honor himself highlights
the dilemma faced by the Court if the
Order to set aside the Affidavit and therefore the Objection were pronounced at
that stage of the hearing. (paragraph 3 of Page 114 of the Brief). His honor
categorically mentions that the need would arise to inquire into the Rights of the 5th and 6th
Respondents if the Objection was set aside. His honor goes on to register his
conclusion that the Court recognizes the need for an inquiry.
(l) To accommodate the above, the
Court invokes Section 532 of the Civil Procedure Code which states:
‘532. In all cases of application for the grant of
the administration of the deceased's property, whether with or without a will,
the court shall, whether a respondent is named in the petition or not, direct
notice of the order nisi in the form No. 84A in the First Schedule to be
advertised twice in a local newspaper before the day of final hearing, the
newspaper to be selected by the court with the object that the notice of the
order nisi should come to the knowledge of all persons interested in the administration of the deceased's property:
Provided that the court may in its discretion direct such other mode of
advertisement in lieu of such publication as to it seems sufficient.’
(m)
Section 533 spells out the duty of the Court
as follows:
‘533. If on the day appointed for final hearing,
or on the day to which it may have been duly adjourned the respondent or any
person upon whom the order nisi has been directed to be served, or any person
then appearing to be interested in the
administration of the deceased's property, satisfies the court that there
are grounds of objection to the application, such as ought to be tried on viva
voice evidence, then the court shall
frame the issues which appear to arise between the parties, and shall direct
them to be tried on a day to be then appointed for the purpose under section
386’
Section
386 states:
‘386. When the respondent's evidence has been
taken, it shall be competent to the
court, on the request of the petitioner, to adjourn the matter to enable the
petitioner to adduce additional evidence; or, if it thinks necessary, it may
frame issues of fact between the petitioner and respondent, and adjourn the
matter for the trial of these issues by
oral testimony. And on the day to which the matter is so adjourned, the
additional evidence shall be adduced, and the issues tried in conformity with,
as nearly as may be, the rules hereinbefore prescribed for the taking of
evidence at the trial of a regular action.’
(n)
Despite the above provision for additional evidence to be adduced by the
Petitioners – the Petitioners did not produce any such evidence in relation to Administration of the Estate. The 4th
Respondent Mrs.SaraswathySabanathan
was facilitated to give evidence to confirm as to whether her share of the
family wealth was dowry or donation. It
is highlighted that Section 525 provides as follows:
‘If the
petitioner has no reason to suppose that his application will be opposed by any
person, he may file with his petition an affidavit to that effect, and may omit
to name any person in his petition as respondent.’
No
such Affidavit was filed in Court .
Section
530 provides as follows:
(1)
When any person shall die without
making a will or where the will cannot be found, every application for grant of
administration of his property may be made to the District Court of the
district within which the applicant resides, or within which the deceased
resided at the time of his death or within which any land belonging to the
deceased's estate is situate. Every such application shall be made on petition
by way of summary procedure, which petition shall set out in the numbered
paragraphs prescribed by section 524, the relevant facts of the absence of the
will, the death of the deceased, and the heirs of the deceased to the best of
the petitioner's knowledge; the petition shall also show the character in which
the petitioner claims and the facts which justify his doing so. The application
shall also be supported by sufficient evidence, to afford prima facie proof of
the material allegations in the petition, and shall name the next of kin of the deceased as respondents.
(2)
(a) The petitioner shall tender with
the petition
(i)
the declaration of property referred
to in section 30 of the Estate Duty Ordinance or in Section 24 of the Estate
Duty Act, as the case may be, in triplicate for transmission by court to the
Commissioner-General of Inland Revenue.
(ii)
draft order nisi;
(iii)
the requisite stamps for the order
nisi and service thereof;
(iv)
draft notice of order nisi in the
form No. 84A in the First Schedule, and (a) proof of payment of the estimated
charges to cover the cost of advertising the notice of order nisi in a local
newspaper as hereinafter provided.
(b) The petitioner may also tender with
the petition the consent in writing of such respondents as consent to his
application
( o) The 4th
Respondent was not included as Petitioner and hence on the face of the
documents before the Court – the 4th Respondent is an Opposing Party
to the Petitioners. This distinction in the position allocated to respective
participants is significant in framing
the issues arising between the
parties as per Section 533 of the Civil Procedure Code. The issue when divided
through the Common Measure / Law – needs to show Equal Rights as the
Petitioners, to the Respondents in Common. Section 525 facilitates the leaving
out of any person as Respondent. If indeed the 4th Respondent was
believed to be supportive of the
Petitioners – that sister ought to have been included as Petitioner or that
sister ought to have given her consent in writing to the Petitioners. The way
it stands – the 4th Respondent whose husband is listed as a Creditor
(page 182 of the Brief) - has dual position – (i) by Right to participate in
the Administration and her silence in terms of consent to the picture drawn by
the Petitioners – the 4th Respondent confirms her position as
Respondent but (ii) in terms of the
share of the Estate – the 4th
Respondent – by agreeing with the picture drawn by her sister and her husband
as Petitioners – becomes part of the Petitioning Group.
(p)
The
Counsel for the Appeal Respondents stated in Court that he represented all
Respondents. If Due Process had been followed – the question needs to be asked
as to why the other Respondents failed
to participate in the primary process – starting with giving their consent in
writing as facilitated by Section 525? The
same Counsel representing both – the Petitioners and the other Respondents in
the Appeal confirms the position that none of the Respondents other than the 5th&
6th Respondents / Appellants is interested in participating in the
Administration of the Estate. It is significant to note that the 4th
Respondent confirmed that the 1st Respondent and she were part of an
intermarriage arrangement. (Page 124 of the Brief) – thereby
indicating greater possibility of collusion which would alienate the 5th
and 6th Respondents.
(q) It
is submitted that having taken over the inquiry through Section 532 of the
Civil Procedure Code, the Court had the
Duty of Care to summon all Respondents to Court to determine the Rights of all
Heirs and also to determine the issue of Administration. Until such process is exhausted
the inquiry process does not get completed and any order prior to such
completion becomes Interlocutory in Nature. The Rights of both opposing parties
need to be facilitated to be on Equal Footing – for the picture of the issues
between the parties to be complete at that level.
(r) The Affidavitof the 5th Respondent who expressly Objected, was set
aside, in breach of the above principle - even though,
on the face of it, it failed to confirm the deficiencies claimed by the
Petitioners.
Section 438 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as follows:
438. Every affidavit shall be entitled as in the
court and action in which it is to be used, and shall be signed by the
declarant in the presence of the court, Justice of the Peace, or Commissioner
before whom it is sworn or affirmed.
It is apparent on the face of the documents(Pages
168 to173 of the Brief)
that the Petitioners applied their standards which are facilitated by Section
439 as follows:
‘439. In the event of the declarant being a blind or illiterate person, or
not able to understand writing in the language of the court, the affidavit
shall at the same time be read over or interpreted to him in his own language,
and the jurist shall express that it was read over or interpreted to him in the
presence of the court. Justice of the Peace, or Commissioner, and that he
appeared to understand the contents; and also that he made his mark or wrote
his signature in the presence of the court, Justice of the Peace, or
Commissioner. And when a mark is made instead of a signature, the person who
writes the marksman's name against the mark shall also sign his name and
address in the presence of the court. Justice of the Peace, or Commissioner.’
The above mentioned Affidavit by the Petitioners under Section
439, is almost identical to the Application / Petition itself – at pages 158 to
161 of the Brief. This confirms that the
Affidavit was prepared for the Petitioners by their Legal Attorney. Hence the
question arises as to whether the matter is to be constructed at the level of
the Petitioners’ investment in law or at the level of the 5th
Respondent’s investment – which is close to that of the Deceased? The
completion of the ‘issues between the parties’ needs to happen at the higher
level of application of the law – which it is submitted is through Section 438
for the 5th Respondent – the closest sibling representing the
investment in Higher Education by the Deceased. This is in conformity with the
principles underpinning Thesawalamai which has been claimed to be applicable to
all parties to this matter. It is submitted that this upholds the Spirit of the
Court which ordered that husband of the 1st Petitioner be included
as Petitioner.
(s) It is submitted that this Testamentary case
is primarily about the Rights of the
Deceased to show the value of his
life to the society that he was a part of.
This value is best shown through the structure that he developed during
his lifetime. The division of status and property reflects how the heirs carry
this forward to benefit current society and the younger generations.
(t) The documents before the Court confirm that
the Petitioners lived in the same house as the Deceased and therefore had
access to movable properties including cash and documents relating to immovable
properties and bank accounts held by the Deceased.
(t) The 4th Respondent – a female
without demonstrated commitment to participate in the Sri Lankan legal process –
wrote to Barclays Bank on behalf of all
heirs including the Brothers of the Deceased.
(u) Court Records on Pages 33 & 34 confirm
that the Court brought the Petitioner – the sister of the Deceased under
Thesawalamaistructure – requiring that the Husband of the Petitioner also be
included as a party. This confirms the
preference allocated to Males to administer and manage, over females under
Thesawalamai structure.
(v )On the face of the Documents before the Court
– the Deceased, the 1st Respondent and the 5th
Respondents are males and all other heirsas stated in the documents are females.
(w) The Court records confirm that the 4th
Respondent wrote to Barlclays Wealth on 21 October 2010. In her evidence, the 4th
Respondent stated that ‘she had attached those letters to the Petition’. (Page
122 of the Brief). Yet, as per Court records – the 4th Respondent is
NOT a Petitioner but a Respondent who did not demonstrate care to follow Due
Process of the Court to register her consent in writing. At the minimum level, this
demonstrates her lack of respect for official processes and the tendency to
override them through her own personal thought – for example that she took care
of all her siblings including the Deceased after the death of her parent. (Page
122 of the Brief). The 4th Respondent took it upon herself to
represent all her siblings when wring to Barclays Wealth but failed to
demonstrate such commitment to the Mallakam District Court. This is in conflict
with the ruling of the Court that the husband of the 1st Petitioner
also be included as Petitioner due to Thesawalamai principles.
(w) Out of the two male heirs – the 1st
Respondent has thus far chosen to remain silent
(x) The 5th Respondent has expressly
demonstrated his commitment and capability by making an independent declaration
as a non-legal lay person – through his Affidavit dated 30 December 2012 (pages
197 & 198 of the Brief) which satisfies the requirements of Section 438 of
the Civil Procedure Code. In addition, as stated in Court by the Counsel for
the Appellants – the 6th Respondent is a Chartered Accountant. Her
support for her husband and her capability to understand the language of Law is
evidenced through her continued participation in Court Process (Page 130 &
131 of the Brief)
(y) The Court-records confirm also that the Court
did use the above mentioned Affidavit by the 5th Respondent, which
fits Section 438, to discipline the
Petitioners’ Attorney at law (Page 38 of the Brief). To then set is aside as
invalid is to deny Equal Footing as the Judge, to the 5th
Respondent. It is submitted that the setting aside of the Affidavit after it
was used by the Court for its own Administrative purposes
is to deny litigants - Equal Opportunity as the Legal Fraternity, to participate in Court Processes.
(z) Relatively speaking – the Petitioners’
Affidavit fits the category facilitated by Section 439 of the Civil Procedure
Code – confirming the lesser literacy of the Petitioners relative to the 5th&
6th Respondents.
(aa) It is submitted that giving preference to
that Affidavit over the one that fits Section 438 would be appropriate if the
Deceased was a female and was not able to understand the language of the Court
/ the Law and therefore confirms a structure where external legal help is
needed to follow the path of Law.
(ab) The Deceased worked as a Chemist in Sri Lanka as well as Overseas
and earned the right for the value of his work related wealth - to be
represented by members of the family with similar attributes - rather than
home-makers whose Affidavit qualified under Section 439 of the Civil Procedure
Code.
(ac )Both sisters of the Deceased confirm that
their father distributed his wealth prior to his death and prior to their
marriages. (Pages 118 & 124 of the Brief). The Court has the responsibility
therefore to inquire as to whether any part of that wealth went to the Deceased
from the father and therefore qualifies as Muthusum which needs to be separated
from his acquired wealth to show heritage value included in that Estate.
(ad)It is submitted that - combined with the refusal
by the Court to approve the filing of
the Affidavit in a format acceptable to
the Court, setting aside the Affidavit amounts to denial of fundamental Right
of the Brother (5th Respondent) to Object to the Petition, on Equal
footing as the other heirs of the Deceased – be it to support or to oppose.
(ae) On 31 May 2011, the Court highlighted similar problems in the Affidavit of the
Petitioners and ordered that they be rectified and the Affidavit be refiled. The denial of such an Opportunity to the 5th
Respondent has the effect of the Court disadvantaging the 5th& 6th
Respondents of their rights on Equal footing as the Petitioners. (Page 32 of
the Brief)
(af) Due to Rights of Heirs not being addressed specifically in the
processes leading to the Decision dated 26 February 2015, it is submitted that
the Order declared on 26 February 2015
amounts to an Interlocutory Order and not a final Judgment.
B
(iv) Section 198 of the Civil Procedure Code states as follows:
[198. When the action
is for an account of any property and for its due administration under the
decree of the court, the court, before making the final decree between the
parties, shall order such accounts and inquiries to be taken and made, and give
such other directions, as it thinks fit.]
It
is submitted that the creditors listed
in the Petition are confirmation that
Administration is essential. The
Court by virtue of Section 198 of the Civil Procedure Code is vested with the duty to order that those
accounts be inquired into. It is
submitted that the final decree cannot be made before this process is
satisfied. Hence the Order made is confirmed to be Interlocutory.
Part 2
B (iv) – Inquiry from a different
angle:
(a)
On
page 5 of the Application filed on 16 March 2015, the Appellants state as follows:
Errors in
Fact–
‘If the Proceedings were
driven by Effects of the action – then the following approach seems the better
fit:
“The
question must depend on what would be the result of the decision of the
Divisional Court, assuming it to be given in favour of either of the parties.
If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally
dispose of the matter in dispute, I
think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if
their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in
dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I
think it is not final, but interlocutory. ” Lord Esher, M.R.cited by Hon Justice SaleemMarsoof, P.C., J. inStorerDuraisamy
Yogendra
&BalasubramaniamThavabalan
Vs. VelupillaiTharmaratnam’
(b)
In
S. RajendranChettiar& Others Vs S. Narayanan ChettiarS.C.Appeal
No. 101A /
2009, escalated from the District
Court case No. 428/T in the District Court of Colombo in relation to the Trustees of the Hindu Temple known as “Sri
Kathirvelayuthan Swami Kovil”, Dr.Shirani A. Bandaranayake, J
includes in her Honor’s reasoning the following:
[Therefore
to ascertain the nature of the decision made by a civil Court as to whether it
is final or not, in keeping with the provisions of section 754(5) of the Civil
Procedure Code, it would be necessary to follow the test defined by Lord Esher
MR in Standared Discount Co. v La Grange (supra) and as stated in Salaman v
Warner (supra) which reads as follows:
“The
question must depend on what would be the result of the decision of the
Divisional Court, assuming it to be given in favour of either of the parties.
If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally
dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules
it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will
finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will
allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory.”
In Salaman v Warner (supra), Fry, L.J., also
had expressed his views regarding an appropriate interpretation that had to be
given to final and interlocutory decisions. Considering the difficulties that
had been raised regarding the correct interpretation for final and
interlocutory orders, it was stated that the attention must be given to the object
of the distinction drawn in 15 the rules between interlocutory and final orders
on the basis of the time for appealing. Fry, L.J. had accordingly stated thus:
“I
think that the true definition is this. I conceive that an order is “final”
only where it is made upon an application or other proceeding which must,
whether such application or other proceeding fail or succeed, determine the
action. Conversely I think that an order is “interlocutory” where it cannot be
affirmed that in either event the action will be determined.”
Considering all the decisions referred to
above, the aforesaid statement clearly has expressed the true meaning that
could be given to a judgment and an order in terms of section 754(5) of the
Civil Procedure Code.
The order made by the Additional District
Judge on 14.05.2008, was in terms of section 46(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
and it is not disputed that the rights of the parties were not considered by
the District Court. In such circumstances it would not be probable to state
that the said order made by the District Court had finally settled the
litigation between the appellants and the plaintiff.
Considering
the circumstances of the appeals it is abundantly clear that at the time the
said order was made by the District Court, the litigation among the parties had
just begun as the plaintiff as a Trustee of the ‘Puthiya Sri Kathiravelayuthan
Swami Kovil’ and its temporalities had instituted action before the District
Court of Colombo, seeking inter alia,
1.
the
appointment of Receiver under section 671 of the Civil Procedure Code for the
preservation and maintenance of the Trust property;
2.
the
removal of the 2nd to 4th appellants and the 1st respondent as trustees of the
Trust; 16
3.
3. the
2nd to 4th appellants and the 1st respondent to account for Rs. 34,000,000/- of
Trust money which had been illegally and immorally appropriated by the 2nd to
4th appellants and the 1st respondent for their personal use.
………………………………
………………………………….
Considering all the abovementioned
it cannot be said that the decision given by the District Court could have
finally disposed the matter in litigation. In Ranjit v Kusumawathi (supra),
Dheeraratne, J. after considering several decisions referred to earlier and the
facts of that appeal had stated thus:
“The order appealed from is an
order made against the appellant at the first hurdle. Can one say that the
order made on the application of the 4th defendant is one such that whichever
way the order was given, it would have finally determined the litigation? Far
from that, even if the order was given in favour of the appellant, he has to
face the second hurdle, namely the trial to vindicate his claim.”
Considering the decision given by
Dheeraratne, J., in Ranjit v Kusumawathi (supra) it is abundantly clear that
the order dated 14.05.2008 is not a final order having the effect of a judgment
within the meaning of sub-sections 754(1) and 754(5) of the Civil Procedure
Code, but is only an interlocutory order. For the reasons aforesaid, both appeals
(S.C. (Appeal) No. 101A /2009 and S.C. (Appeal) No. 101B /2009), are dismissed
and the judgment of the High Court dated 21.11.2008 is affirmed.]
(
c) It is submitted that the Order if given in favour of the 5th&
6th Respondents, would have required for the matter to proceed to
complete the picture – in terms of Administration. But as it stands – the Order
confirms that no further inquiry is needed into this aspect. Hence the awarding
of Certificates of Heirship – on the basis of this Order would block the path
of Due Process needed to settle creditors - at least one of whom is a
Respondent (Page 178 of the Brief) and
whose wife wrote to Barclay’s Bank – effectively assuming the Administrator’s
position.
(d
)It is submitted that if the Deceased himself were to delegate authority to
manage his wealth - he would have chosen the one with equal or higher skills as
himself to preserve and protect his savings.
On the face of the information before the Court this is the 5th
Respondent with the support of the 6th Respondent. The Court owes
the Deceased this honor of representation reflecting his higher level
participation in maintaining social order.
It is humbly submitted that this is along the same lines as Mr.
Parathalingam P.C. representing the Appeal Respondents – as highlighted by his
honor in Court. The parallel of Mr. Parathalingam P.C. - in the case of
litigants – is the 6th Respondent empowered by the delegated power
of the 5th Respondent. The way the lay person interprets the law is
Equally important as the way the legal expert does. Hence the Experience base as highlighted by the
Judges hearing the above mentioned
matterChettiar v Chettiar:
“There is a note in the Supreme Court Practice 1970 under RSC Ord. 59, r
4, from which it appears that different tests have been stated from time to
time as to what is final and what is interlocutory. In Standard Discount Co. v
La Grange and Salaman v Warner, Lord Esher MR said that the test was the nature
of the application to the Court and not the nature of the order which the Court
eventually made. But in Bozson v Altrincham Urban District Council, the Court
said that the test was the nature of the order as made. Lord Alverstone C.J.
said that the test is: ‘Does the judgment or order, as made, finally 12 dispose
of the rights of the parties?’ Lord Alverstone C.J. was right in logic but Lord
Esher MR was right in experience. Lord
Esher MR’s test has always been applied in practice. For instance, an
appeal from a judgment under RSC Ord. 14 (even apart from the new rule) has
always been regarded as interlocutory and notice of appeal had to be lodged
within 14 days. An appeal from an order striking out an action as being
frivolous or vexatious, or as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or
dismissing it for want of prosecution – every such order is regarded as
interlocutory: See Hunt v Allied Bakeries Ltd., so I would apply Lord Esher
MR’s test to an order refusing a new trial. I look to the application for a new
trial and not to the order made. If the application for a new trial were
granted, it would clearly be interlocutory. So equally when it is refused, it
is interlocutory. It was so held in an unreported case, Anglo-Auto Finance
(Commercial) Ltd. V Robert Dick, and we should follow it today. This question
of ‘final’ or ‘interlocutory’ is so uncertain, that the only thing for
practitioners to do is to look up the practice books and see what has been
decided on the point. Most orders have now been the subject of decision. If a
new case should arise, we must do the best we can with it. There is no other
way” (emphasis added).
(e)The
Deductions claimed in the Petition (Page 178 of the Brief) are examples of
areas requiring Administration. These have not been addressed by the Court at
all.
(f
)(i) IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE ORDER AS DELIVERED HAS THE EFFECT OF COMPLETING THE PICTURE FOR THE PETITIONERS BUT,
(ii)
LEAVES UNADDRESSED THE RIGHTS OF OPPOSING RESPONDENTS WHO AS PER THEIR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAWFUL REQUIREMENTS, NEEDED THE MATTER TO PROCEED TO INCLUDE THEIR
‘FACTS’ TO STRUCTURE THE PICTURE THROUGH WHICH THE SAID WEALTH WAS DEVELOPED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
DECEASED, AND
(iii)
FAILED TO FACILITATE THE EXPRESSION AND INCLUSION OF THE LEGITIMATE BELIEFS
NEEDED TO INHERIT THE WEALTH OF AN ELDER AT ITS HIGHEST VALUE, PROCESSED THROUGH THE LAWS OF THE SOCIETY THAT
HE WAS VERY MUCH A PART OF.
(iv)IT
IS SUBMITTED THAT THE VALUE OF THE WEALTH INVOLVED IS RELATIVE TO THE
STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES THROUGH WHICH IT PASSES. TREATING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
AS A FINAL JUDGMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY DENY THAT HIGHER VALUE TO THE LIFE OF THE
DECEASED – AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE - TO THE SOCIETY HE WAS PART OF. THE
THRESHOLD NEEDS TO BE RAISED TO REPRESENT THE TRUE VALUE AS PER THE CHARACTER
THAT MR. SUBRAMANIAM YOGANATHANCONFIRMED.
THE CONFIRMATION THAT THE ORDER WAS INTERLOCUTORY IS THE FIRST STEP NEEDED TO
ESCALATE THE VALUE OF THE MATTER TO ITS EARNED
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